| Picts | Mons Graupius | Picts |
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The Battle of Mons Graupius |
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The site of the battle of Mons Graupius fought in 84 AD is generally thought to be at Bennachie near Inverurie, in the north-east of the country, about 17 miles north west of Aberdeen. The Romans built a fortified 140 acre camp near here at Logie Durno and there was an Iron Age settlement on the summit of the nearby 'Mither Tap', that was fortified with a 20ft thick granite boulder rampart that follows a circuit of about 200m and is still today about 14ft high in places. The whole area round about the battle site was a Pict stronghold. The name of the site of the battle probably comes from Pict word for 'hump' ( 'crup' or 'graup' ), which the Romans transliterated as 'Graupius', so Mons Graupius would translate as 'Humped Hill' or 'Outcrop Hill'. The word 'Graupius' was the origin of the name for the whole mountain range in the area - the Grampians. The Romans would have expected to route the Picts, just as they had vanquished the Iceni tribe in East Anglia in modern England - 20 years earlier. Then, only 10,000 Romans had defeated 60,000 tribesmen led by Queen Boudicca ( meaning Queen Victorious ). At Mons Graupius a Roman army twice the size of the one at the battle in East Anglia faced a force of Picts half the size of Boudicca's army - Roman expectations would have been high. Tacitus records that the Picts had massed and taken up position at the top of the hill, leaving the Romans an uphill fight on a slope that gave the Picts a tactical advantage. We know that the Roman army numbered about 20,000 troops, consisting of 8,000 Pretanic [ English ] Auxiliary Infantry occupying the centre, the wings consisting of 3,000 horse, the army being about one tenth of the total Army in the Roman world. The bulk of the invading troops were Auxiliaries from Western Germanic tribes i.e. Batavi from modern Netherlands and the Tungrians of modern Belgium, backed up by Roman citizen units. Tacitus tells us that the Caledonians numbered about 30,000 men.
The photograph on the left is of 'Pictavia' the centre for the display of Pictish culture and artefacts Some of the claims of Tacitus can only be described as ridiculous. For example he claims that, 'the swords of the Britons ( note - Britons not just Picts ) are not pointed and do not allow them to close with the foe, or to fight in the open field.' What nation on earth does not have some kind of point to their sword, or have swords that do not allow them to close on the enemy, or are only useful indoors - not in open fields ? Of all the Pict swords unearthed by archaeologists - not one even approximates the description of Tacitus. View Pict swords unearthed by archaeologists that disprove Tacitus |
Tacitus claims that the Romans thought the swords used by the Picts would be ineffective weapons during the battle, but were surprised by how lethal they were in the hands of a trained Pict warrior. He states 'Their swords...seemed a poor choice of sword to the legions until they saw that these monstrosities could actually be used quickly and efficiently with proper training'. ( a hint of Pict organisation - they had a system of martial training for young warriors ). |
Pict Battle Strategy |
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We can deduce the type of strategy used against the Romans at Mons Graupius from what we know of a later battle ( mentioned in Bede's history ), fought not that far from Mons Graupius, at Dunnichen in modern Angus in the north east of Scotland, between the Picts and Angles from the kingdom of Bernicia ( in modern northern England ). Both Mons Graupius and Dunnichen were fought in an age when little changed over long periods of time and they had common features. Both battles involved an invading force; both invaders were allowed to enter right to the heart of Pict territory. Both battle sites were chosen by the Picts, both battles were on a hillside, both sites were near a Pict fort, both battles involved a nearby wood and in both battles the Picts retreated. In one battle the Picts were suspected of attempting an ambush, in the other it was the major cause of their victory.
View the Pict carved stone on the site of the battle at |
On the left is the 'Aberlemno Stone' Note also the three infantry figures in the central left of the stone. The first is a swordsman with his shield, followed by two ranks of spearmen. The shield strapped to the shoulder or upper arm of the first spearman rank can be clearly seen. The spearmen have a shield with what appears to be a defensive spike in its centre, while the swordsman has a smaller hand held shield ( buckler ) with a central round boss. The sword on the shoulder of the first warrior bears no resemblance to the ridiculous description of Tacitus. It is not monstrously large and has a distinctive point. The Pict warriors did not wear helmets or heavy armour, so while lacking in protection they would have been faster, more agile and manoeuvrable than the heavier legionnaires. We can infer that the Pict fighting methods and arms were similar on both occasions. For instance, notice the smallness of the Pict swordsman's shield in centre left of the stone engraving, which matches Tacitus description of 'their little shields'. If, despite a 300 year war with the Romans ( and the period between Mons Graupius and Dunnichen ), the design of the shield of the Picts had changed little, then it would be reasonable to assume that the design of the Pict sword had changed little, especially as they are related arms which were used together. This point is proven beyond dispute by the archaeological evidence of Pict swords, which show a sword length consistency for at least 1,500 years. The Picts may possibly have been more organised in the later battle, but we have no proof of that, especially as their 300 year war with the Romans implies a high degree of organisation and leadership from their commanders called ‘Toiseachs’ and powerful local sub-kings ( or lords ) known as ‘Mormaers’. |
Spear Battle Line |
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According to the 'Aberlemno Stone' the Pict battle line seems to have been a type of simplified Greek Phalanx, consisting of a front rank of swordsmen with round or oval shields, followed by two ranks of spearmen. The spearmen advanced with both hands holding their spear, while pointing one shoulder to the enemy. This shoulder or upper arm had a shield strapped to it, protecting the spearman's upper body on the side nearest the enemy. The job of the spearmen was to protect the front rank of swordsmen and to pierce an opening in the enemy line, allowing the swordsmen to get among the enemy ranks. Chariots would where possible, quickly ferry men to these points of enemy weakness, allowing the Pict warriors to concentrate troops at these areas of confusion and press the advantage. Read about the Scottish spear formation at the |
The Pict battle line at Mons Graupius had an extra psychological advantage; they painted themselves with blue woad, which even Julius Caesar graphically confessed, gave them a 'TERRIFYING APPEARANCE IN BATTLE'. The Picts also used a strident sounding, loud war trumpet called a Carnyx in the classic shape of a boar's head to add to the terrifying din and clamour of the battle. One Roman described its sound as a 'dreadful din'. This forerunner of the Bagpipes had a similar effect during battles. One of these war trumpets was found about 40 miles from the Mons Graupius battle site. You can see and hear a modern reconstruction of the Pict Carnyx
by clicking | Notice in the stone engraving above that the spearman is not pointing his spear at the rider; he is aiming at a bigger target - the horse. Bring the horse down and you'll get the rider. Tacitus admits that at Mons Graupius the determined, tenacious Pict battle lines, which he unwittingly praised by describing them as 'solid ranks' and directly praises as displaying both 'courage and skill', were effective at bringing the massive Roman 3,000 horse cavalry charge to - 'a standstill'. At any point in history, even for much larger armies - to stonewall a 3,000 horse cavalry charge was no mean feat ! How would you like to stand in a line with nothing but a spear watching 3,000 cavalry at full gallop charging straight at you ? One of the great omissions of Tacitus is that he does not detail the role of the Pict cavalry during the battle - yet it must have been significant - His only reference to them is that, 'Meantime the enemy's cavalry had fled.' The Picts were very skilled horsemen who had small, highly manoeuvrable war ponies. They used a simple bridle, which they let go off during fighting, their horses were trained to be steered by the weight of the rider shifting on their back and by commands given through movement of the rider's legs and feet. This left both of the rider's hands free to handle weapons and engage the enemy. They used a simple saddle with a large, rough padded blanket that gave the rider a good grip astride the horse and gave the flanks of the horse a fair measure of protection. In his account of the battle Tacitus concentrates on the Pict chariots, which were at a disadvantage because of the rough slopping ground of the battlefield and would fall easy prey to the Roman cavalry. Although it is highly unlikely, Tacitus gives the impression that the Picts did not have cavalry at Mons Graupius, but he possibly avoided any details of them in his account because of their relative effectiveness. |
The Battle |
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At Mons Graupius ( after the rousing speech by Calgacus ), Tacitus says that 'the multitude gathered around him [ Calgacus ] clamouring for battle' and that 'Bodies of troops began to assemble and arms blazed, as the boldest warriors stepped to the front. All the time their battle-line' ( a hint that the Picts were organised ) 'was taking shape and their army rose in an arch-like form up the slope of the hill', ( another hint of Pict organisation. Note - not a straight battle formation mirroring the straight line of the Legions, but a half moon shape, ready to encircle, perhaps similar to the tactic used by the Zulus ). The fighting began with exchanges of missiles and the Caledonian's 'showed both courage and skill in avoiding and parrying our missiles with their great swords, or catching them on their little shields, while they themselves poured on us a dense shower of darts'. The armies began to clash with the Picts' chariots being the first to engage the Romans with some success, Tacitus admits that the Pict 'chariots at first spread panic.' among the Legions. Agricola ordered the Roman cavalry to counter the threat from the chariots and after bitter fighting the chariots of the Caledonian were scattered, enabling the cavalry to turn on the Caledonian infantry. A Roman cavalry officer named Aulus Atticus, the commander of a cohort, 'was carried by the charge of his horse deep into the ranks of the enemy'; the Picts cut him down instantly. Again Tacitus records that, 'the battle now looked anything but favourable to us, with our infantry precariously perched on the slope and jostled by the flanks of the horses. And often a stray chariot, its horses panic-stricken without a driver, came plunging in on flank or front'. It was at this point that Agricola employed his reserve forces in an outflanking manoeuvre that eventually brought defeat to the Caledonians. This was an expensive lesson for the Picts, but a lesson they learned well, for this would be one of the few open field battles between the Romans and the combined forces of the Picts. Tacitus claimed that 10,000 Picts were killed in the battle and that only 360 legionnaires died, but in the light of immediately following events the Pict casualty figures appear to have been wildly inflated. These exaggerated claims were not uncommon among the Romans e.g. one Roman historian wrote that in one of the three Roman invasions of Caledonia the Romans lost 50,000 men - most historians sensibly question this figure. Setting aside these specific claims, the bias of historical legacy is that pro-Roman figures are generally believed and anti-Roman figures are not. If Tacitus was right and one out of every three Picts had been killed and the army completely routed, why were orders given to the legionnaires not to pursue the fleeing enemy ? Tacitus states that in pursuing the Picts 'serious loss would have been sustained because of the confidence of our troops'. He is implying that their confidence was misplaced, misled and misguided, but if they had in reality completely routed the Picts as he claimed, then the confidence of the Legions would have been well founded. He records, 'Indeed, when they [ the Picts ] reached the woods, they rallied and profited by their local knowledge to attack, the first rash pursuers.' This may have been the deliberate intent of the Picts through the strategy of retreating. 'Our excess of confidence might even have led to no inconsiderable disaster'. Does the Roman reaction sound like the reaction of a victorious army that has just completely routed their enemy ? It sounds rather as if Tacitus is trying to excuse the lack of pursuit and destruction of the Pictish army, by claiming two contradictory things. On the one hand that the Picts were utterly vanquished and fled in confusion and panic and on the other that they were too determined, organised and dangerous to pursue because they had set an ambush for the pursuers. Both descriptions would only appear true to Tacitus if the retreat was a tactical move by the Picts feigning fleeing to draw the Romans into a preset trap. Tacitus' description of the Pict retreat was meant to flatter the Romans but it actually tells us more about the retreat of the Picts than he meant to say. He states that the Pict army, 'fled in whole battalions with arms in their hands.' In ancient Sparta if a warrior returned with his arms it was considered proof that he was not a cowardly run-away. Spartan mothers said to their sons. 'Either come back with your shield or on it'. Either carry your shield home or be carried dead on your shield. If they came back without their shield they were known to be cowards who had thrown their shield away to flee faster from the battle. The Pict forces did not throw their arms away in order to flee faster, so it would be logical to assume that 'whole battalions' kept them because the retreat was a tactical move - not a cowardly route Rather than chase the Picts Agricola, 'ordered the cohorts to rally, discard their equipment and ring the woods like hunters.' The Romans formed a line along the edge of the woods, which seems no more than a defensive move, he allowed some searching to be done by units of cavalry who no doubt found some wounded and dying Picts to despatch, but the infantry were not involved in the search, they were standing in line 'like hunters'. The main search was done the next day when the Picts had melted away into the landscape. They did not simply flee in panic but coolly and deliberately continued to employ tactics and clearly signalled their firm defiant intention to continue the fight by deliberately taking the time to evacuate the local families and burn their own homes and crops in the immediate area. Tacitus writes of the scene the day after the battle, 'an awful silence reigned on every hand; the hills were deserted, houses smoking in the distance, and our scouts did not meet a soul'. Calgacus had said of the Romans, 'They create a wilderness and they call it peace'. The Pict leaders created a wilderness and called it - WAR ! The message was plain and simple the Picts would rather burn their homes and farms than live in them under Roman rule. Clearly, they were not a defeated people, they may have lost the battle and temporarily evacuated the area but they were determined to win the war. It seems that Mons Graupius was not as decisive as Tacitus claimed, which may be the reason that he spends so much time in describing it as a great victory for Agricola. There were probably rumours in Rome, ( because of the Roman retreat from Caledonia ), that Mons Graupius could not have been the great victory it was first believed to be and so Tacitus felt that in order to defend his father in law he had to labour and exaggerate the point. The Picts tactical retreat gave the legionnaires a false sense of victory and confidence, which was recognised by Agricola - who may have suspected that the retreat was in fact an ambush, as some Romans found it to be - and so he restrained his troops. Why would he be suspicious of an ambush ? Perhaps because he knew the defeat was not as complete as Tacitus relates and history has believed. The tactical retreat of the Picts was executed so convincingly, that even today many pro-Roman historians are totally convinced of the rout of the Picts in spite of related historical evidence to the contrary. If they had been in charge of the Roman legions at Mons Graupius the outcome of the battle would have been completely different. Certainly the Romans won the Battle of Mons Graupius; however, the bottom line is that later historical events prove it to have been a moderate victory that temporarily checked the Pict resistance whereas Tacitus claims it was a rout that resulted in the Roman conquest of Caledonia. He then has to stretch the credulity of his readers by claiming that something happened to Caledonia that happened to no other subjugated country - Caledonia was let go from the Empire by some sort of bad management. Perhaps Tacitus has given us the first instance in history of - the story of the one that got away. How serious was the Pict defeat at Mons Graupius ? It is highly improbable that Tacitus' claim of the astronomical number of 10,000 Picts killed at Mons Graupius is true. Even if we assume that as against the 360 alleged Roman fatalities, the Picts' casualty figures were as high as one in ten i.e. 3,000 men, this figure would still be hard to justify in the light of subsequent events. Historical evidence points to Mons Graupius being a serious defeat for the Picts but not a crushing or irreversible one. Three indicators help in giving a realistic picture of the Pict casualties.
How impartial was Tacitus ? |
After Mons Graupius Agricola was summoned back to Rome and at a ceremony the Emperor was given the credit for the victory. Agricola was rewarded by being given a governorship in Syria. There was a great deal that depended on this battle being reported as a great Roman victory, the very reputation of Caesar was at stake. Therefore we can understand and even excuse Tacitus for putting a spin on the truth for the sake of Caesar and the Empire, but most of all, for the man he seems genuinely to have admired, Agricola his father-in-law - and all he had to do was turn what was probably a moderate victory into a major triumph. The later historical events do not fit the Roman account of the battle, if Tacitus account is believed to be accurate then the historical evidence of later events has to be twisted violently to fit, but - the facts do not fit the Roman account. |
The Secret |
Did the Caledonians have any use for the Roman Wall ? |
An alternative account of the battle of Mons Graupius | Mons Graupius Revisited | |
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